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an overview of arMed ConfliCts in late ByzantiuM:
theoretiCal fraMework and Current researCh*
Military history, although viewed by most outsiders as a unified field of 
scholarship, usually takes two forms, not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but often quite distinct from each other. On the one hand, there are those 
who view military history from the point of organisation and institutions; 
to pose it differently, they are interested in establishing what an army is. 
Others focus on warfare itself: battles, tactics, and military strategy; in other 
words, they study what an army does. Historians of the latter persuasion are 
viewed by proponents of the so-called “new military history” as nothing 
more than devotees to an obsolescent histoire événementielle1. However, one 
can hardly question the pivotal role played by warfare in human history 
and, since military engagements are the tesserae which form this mosaic in 
all its gory detail, the necessity to study armed conflict and its effects on 
human society is self-evident.
* The project entitled “ANAVATHMIS. Historical research and digital applications” 
(MIS 5002357) is implemented under the “Action for the Strategic Development on the 
Research and Technological Sector”, funded by the Operational Programme “Competitiveness, 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (NSRF 2014–2020) and co-financed by Greece and the 
European Union (European Regional Development Fund).
Η Πράξη με τίτλο: «ΑΝΑΒΑΘΜΙΣ. Ανάπτυξη της ιστορικής έρευνας: μελέτες και 
ψηφιακές εφαρμογές» και κωδικό MIS 5002357 εντάσσεται στη «Δράση Στρατηγικής 
Ανάπτυξης Ερευνητικών και Τεχνολογικών Φορέων» και χρηματοδοτείται από το 
Επιχειρησιακό Πρόγραμμα «Ανταγωνιστικότητα, Επιχειρηματικότητα και Καινοτομία» 
στο πλαίσιο του ΕΣΠΑ 2014–2020, με τη συγχρηματοδότηση της Ελλάδας και της 
Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης).
1. For a brief introduction to the methodological (and occasionally ideological) aspects 
of these academic issues, see J. Bourke, New military history, in: Palgrave Advances in 
Modern Military History, ed. M. huGhes – w. J. philpott, London 2006, 258-280.
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The Late Byzantine era is a characteristic example of a historical period 
marked by war as an endemic phenomenon, impacting on both everyday life 
and the political history of the lands around the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Whether as active agents of this reality or as hapless victims at the receiving 
end of it, the Byzantines never ceased to be engaged in military conflicts 
in the period between the Latin sacks of Constantinople in 1203–1204 
and the ultimate fall of the last remnants of the Eastern Roman Empire 
in the years after the middle of the fifteenth century. And yet it was only 
in recent decades that historians have began to systematically study the 
military history of Late Byzantium, when the first monographs on the 
subject appeared2. The first such study was that of Mark Bartusis, whose 
work set the tone for later researchers3. His book, however, is a study of the 
army within the framework of Late Byzantine society and, although the 
first part does contain a brief military history of the period, the bulk of it 
deals with the army as an institution. It was probably in an attempt to fill 
the gaps left by Bartusis’ study that Savvas kyriakidis added chapters on 
military leadership, siege warfare and tactics to his own book; it remains, 
2. Until then, students of Late Byzantium had usually treated armies in brief chapters 
attached to more general works of political or administrative history: e.g. l.-p. rayBaud, Le 
gouvernement et l’administration centrale de l’empire byzantin sous les premiers Paléologues 
(1258–1354), Paris 1968, 237-251; d. a. zakythinos, Le Despotat grec de Morée II. Vie 
et institutions, London 19752, 132-145; M. anGold, A Byzantine Government in Exile. 
Government and Society Under the Laskarids of Nicaea (1204–1261), Oxford 1975, 182-201. 
There were also specialized studies dealing with particular aspects of Late Byzantine military 
organization: e.g. n. oikonoMidès, Contribution à l’étude de la pronoia au XIIIe siècle. Une 
formule d’attribution de parèques à un pronoiare, RΕB 22 (1964), 158-175; ideM, À propos des 
armées des premiers Paléologues et des compagnies de soldats, TM 8 (1981), 353-371; M. C. 
Bartusis, The Megala Allagia and the Tzaousios: Aspects of Provincial Military Organization 
in Late Byzantium, REB 47 (1989), 183-207; ideM, On the Problem of Smallholding Soldiers 
in Late Byzantium, DOP 44 (1990), 1-26; B. hendriCkx, Allagion, tzaousios et prôtallagatôr 
dans le contexte moréote: quelques remarques, REB 50 (1992), 207-217. One should not 
disregard the earlier work of n. kaloMenopoulos, Ἡ στρατιωτικὴ ὀργάνωσις τῆς ἑλληνικῆς 
αὐτοκρατορίας τοῦ Βυζαντίου, Athens 1937; even a cursory glance at this book, however, 
will convince the reader that the retired general’s scholarship was not of the highest caliber. 
For a modern look on the strategic situation of Byzantium, see e. n. luttwak, The Grand 
Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass. – London 2009.
3. M. C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and Society, 1204–1453, 
Philadelphia 1992.
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however, an institutional history of the Late Byzantine army4. The same 
can be said of kosmas Panagiotidis’ doctoral thesis: an analysis of the 
organization and command structure of Late Byzantine armies5. On the 
other hand, the monograph of Efstratia Synkellou deals with a multitude 
of military operations and their various aspects, though the geographical 
focus (Western Greece) of the book is limited6.
At first glance, the doctoral dissertation of Nikolaos kanellopoulos, 
written almost two decades after Bartusis’ book and one year before 
kyriakidis’ work was published, appears to conform to the precepts of “old 
school” military history7. kanellopoulos collected information on major 
military engagements that took place in the Byzantine lands around the 
Aegean during the period 1204–1461 and then went on to analyze that data 
to produce a concise picture of the organization of the Late Byzantine army. 
This methodology –examining important actions and campaigns, followed 
by general comments on the tactics employed by the opponents– was a 
well-established one. The first nineteenth-century specialists in ancient and 
medieval military history (historians with little or no military experience, 
or officers applying to the study of history the analytical methods used by 
contemporary army staffs) had penned works that focused heavily, if not 
exclusively, on battle tactics8. This stemmed from the idée fixe that pitched 
battles are the only decisive factor in warfare.
The idea was not a nineteenth-century one; as early as the sixteenth 
century, philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli had stated that “a day that brings 
4. s. kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium, 1204–1453 [History of Warfare 67], 
Leiden – Boston 2011.
5. k. s. panaGiotidis, Η οργάνωση του στρατού κατά την ύστερη βυζαντινή 
περίοδο (1204–1453), Thessaloniki 2004 (accessible in https://www.didaktorika.gr/eadd/
handle/10442/17953).
6. e. synkellou, Ο πόλεμος στον δυτικό ελλαδικό χώρο κατά τον ύστερο Μεσαίωνα 
(13ος–15ος αι.) [IBR/NHRF Monographs 8], Athens 2008.
7. n. s. kanellopoulos, Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού στην 
ύστερη περίοδο (1204–1461), Volos 2010 (accessible in https://www.didaktorika.gr/eadd/
handle/10442/29081).
8. For a brief overview of this trend in the study of the military history of the Middle 
Ages in general and the Crusades in particular, see r. C. sMail, Crusading Warfare 1097–
1193, Cambridge 1956, 3-17.
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you victory cancels every other bad action you have taken”9. The perception 
that campaigns could be won without battle, or at least without field 
engagements being the decisive factor, had prevailed during the Ancien 
Régime10; this belief, however, along with the political and social system 
that had fostered it, came crushing down during the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815). Based on the lessons learned from the 
latter, the great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz propounded the theory 
that the “decisive battle” is of cardinal significance in military strategy; as 
he poses it, “trial by combat is to military operations what cash payment is 
to financial transactions”11.
Clausewitzian theories influenced not only the strategic thinking of 
the military and political leadership of almost every Western nation, but 
also the views of modern historians. This was largely due to the work of 
Hans Delbrück, Europe’s preeminent military historian in the first decades 
of the twentieth century12. In his magnum opus, the first to study the 
art of war within the framework of political history13, Delbrück applied 
Clausewitz’s strategic precepts to the study of military history, coining 
the terms Niederwerfungsstrategie (“strategy of overthrow”, less accurately 
translated as “annihilation strategy”), Ermattungsstrategie (“strategy of 
9. Both quotes (the latter in the original) may be found in sMail, Warfare, 14.
10. See Ch. duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, London 1987, 189-
190, and J. a. lynn, Battle. A History of Combat and Culture, Boulder 2003, 111-114. For a 
general military history of the periods in question, see r. f. weiGley, The Age of Battles, The 
Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1991.
11. Quoted (with some variations in the translation) in J. keeGan, The Face of Battle. 
A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme, London 1976, 29-30. See also the Greek 
edition of C. von Clausewitz, Περί του Πολέμου, trans. n. xepoulia, Thessaloniki 1989, 
70 (also with some slight differences in the translation). For a detailed analysis of the 
influence of Clausewitzian theory on Marxist thinking, see p. kondylis, Theorie des Krieges: 
Clausewitz – Marx – Engels – Lenin, Stuttgart 1988.
12. a. BuCholz, Hans Delbrück and the German Military Establishment: War Images in 
Conflict, Iowa City 1985. See also J. luvaas, The Great Military Historians and Philosophers, 
in: A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History, ed. J. e. Jessup, Jr. – r. w. Coakley, 
Washington, D.C. 1979, 77-80.
13. h. delBrueCk, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 
vol. I-IV, Berlin 1900–19203.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:54:05 |
181AN OVERVIEW OF ARMED CONFLICTS IN LATE BYZANTIUM 
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 31 (2021), 177-191
attrition”) and Manöverstrategie (“manoeuvre strategy”14). Both Delbrück 
and contemporary strategists believed that pitched battles were the only 
war-winning tool in a commander’s arsenal15. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Saxon 
world was already moving independently towards similar conclusions, 
thanks largely to the work of Sir Edward Creasy. The English historian and 
jurist had published a descriptive list of battles, from Marathon to Waterloo, 
that had decisively influenced the history of the West16. The success of 
Creasy’s book spawned a slew of similar publications and it enjoyed immense 
popularity in Britain, due mainly to the Victorian ethics permeating the 
book, allowing battles to be viewed not as indiscriminate carnage, but as 
milestones along the West’s historical road to progress17.
The combined effect of Delbrück and Creasy was evident in Sir Charles 
Oman, whose work dominated the field of medieval military history during 
the first half of the twentieth century18. Even the post-WWII generations 
of scholars did not stray far from the “decisive battle” paradigm, devoting 
most of their research to the study of field tactics and military organization. 
That is not to say, of course, that they were not open to fresh ideas and 
new interpretations. The French medievalist Ferdinand Lot believed that 
siegecraft was of particular importance in the study of medieval warfare; 
yet his book is a description of the art of war through the study of battle 
tactics19. Jan Verbruggen was better qualified as a military historian, having 
served as an officer in the Belgian Army before studying history; he made 
a number of important contributions, but his methods did not differ from 
those of earlier historians20. Finally, Philippe Contamine also limited the 
14. See in general G. a. CraiG, Delbrück: The Military Historian, in: Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. p. paret, Princeton 1986, 326-353.
15. For Delbrück’s place in medieval military historiography, see J. f. verBruGGen, The 
Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, Woodbridge – Rochester 19972, 
3-10, and sMail, Warfare, 8-10.
16. e. s. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London 1851.
17. keeGan, Battle, 57-62.
18. C. w. C. oMan, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, London 1924 (a 
revised and enlarged version of the earlier 1898 edition).
19. f. lot, L’art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche-
Orient, Paris 1946.
20. J. f. verBruGGen, De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, IXe tot begin 
XIVe eeuw, Brussels 1954. His work became more accessible to academic circles when it was 
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scope of his study to military organization and tactics, though he did include 
a brief description of siege engines21.
By the time kanellopoulos began working on his thesis, modern 
researchers had already shifted their perspectives. Since the 1990s it 
became clear that sieges and raids, not battles, were the most common types 
of military conflict in the Middle Ages. Scholars finally came to realize 
that siege warfare was the key component of medieval military strategy22, 
along with raids aimed specifically at devastating the lands of the opponents 
and disrupting the lives of non-combatants23. Thus, although a significant 
portion of his research interests, both then and later, revolved around battle 
analysis and field tactics24, kanellopoulos widened the focus of his research 
to include Late Byzantine sieges and raids, thus showing that strategies of 
attrition and manoeuvre were just as important as annihilation and the 
quest for the decisive battle.
When the research project “A Gazetteer of Late Byzantine Military 
Conflicts” of the Institute of Historical Research/National Hellenic Research 
Foundation was in its planning stage (2016–2018), one of the original aims 
of the project team was to follow in the footsteps of earlier scholars and 
collect evidence from battles in an effort to create an online reference tool 
for Byzantine field tactics. After work on the project had began, however, it 
translated into English, with an added chapter on the eighth century, but with the footnotes 
left out (J. f. verBruGGen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, 
from the Eighth Century to 1340, Amsterdam – New York 1977). The second edition of the 
translation (see above, n. 15) includes both the original footnotes and bibliographical updates.
21. ph. ContaMine, La guerre au moyen âge, Paris 1980.
22. On the predominance of siege warfare in the Middle Ages, see B. s. BaChraCh, 
Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance, Journal of Military History 58 (1994), 119-
133, esp. 119-122 (on the treatment of siege warfare by earlier medievalists, including Lot, 
Verbruggen and Contamine).
23. The most characteristic example are the great cavalry raids (chevauchées) conducted 
by English armies against French-held territories during the Hundred Years’ War (1339–
1453): see in general B. s. BaChraCh – d. s. BaChraCh, Warfare in Medieval Europe c. 400 
– c. 1453, London – New York 2017, 366-368.
24. For examples of his work on battle analysis, see n. s. kanellopoulos – i. k. lekea, 
Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική εναντίον των Φράγκων κατά τον 13ο αιώνα και η μάχη 
του Tagliacozzo, ByzSym 19 (2009), 63-81; eideM, Prelude to kephissos (1311): An Analysis 
of the Battle of Apros (1305), Journal of Medieval Military History 12 (2014), 119-137.
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became clear that most conflicts found in the historical record were either 
sieges or “raids” – the latter term used to include all campaigns that did 
not involve a pitched battle with the enemy’s regular troops and ultimately 
affected the non-combatant population, either by plan or by happenstance. 
This seemed to run contrary to kanellopoulos’ Tables 6.1 and 6.2, containing 
military events from the thirteenth and fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, 
respectively, many of them battles rather than raids and sieges25. One key 
methodological aspect of our research that might explain this difference is the 
fact that our project was ultimately mapped out to collect as many military 
conflicts as possible, regardless of how detailed (or not) their description is 
in the sources. Although the total number of conflicts recorded thus far has 
yet to be tabulated, a “macroscopic” analysis of early records shows that 
battles (including minor engagements that might more properly qualify as 
skirmishes or ambushes26) were never more than 20% of the total number of 
conflicts, and sometimes the percentage was much smaller.
Let us outline our thesis with an example from a single campaigning 
season, one that is well-documented and also quite long by medieval 
25. kanellopoulos, Οργάνωση, 335-336.
26. For instance, both Tracheiai (1207) and Arbanon (1217) have been classified as 
“battles”. However, the former was actually nothing more than a small-scale engagement 
between an unknown number of Nicaean troops under general Andronikos Gidos and a 
mounted force of approximately 300 knights and sergents d’armes, essentially the Latin 
garrison of nearby Nicomedia raiding the countryside for provisions: see Niketas Choniates, 
Χρονικὴ Διήγησις, ed. J. van dieten, Nicetae Choniatae Historia [CFHB 11/1], Berlin – 
New York 1975, 641; ideM, Λόγοι καὶ ἐπιστολαί, ed. J. van dieten, Nicetae Choniatae 
Orationes et Epistulae [CFHB 3], Berlin – New York 1972, 145-146; Geoffrey Villehardouin, 
La conquête de Constantinople, ed.-trans. e. faral, Paris 1939, ch. 480-486; kanellopoulos, 
Οργάνωση, 48-51; i. Giarenis, Η συγκρότηση και η εδραίωση της αυτοκρατορίας της 
Νίκαιας. Ο αυτοκράτορας Θεόδωρος Α΄ Κομνηνός Λάσκαρις [IBR/NHRF Monographs 
12], Athens 2008, 98, 173. As for the latter, researchers have yet to agree on whether the 
forces of Latin emperor Pierre de Courtenay and cardinal Giovanni Colonna were ambushed 
in the mountain passes of Albania by the forces of Theodore I of Epirus or the latter simply 
pretended to lead them to safety, only to betray them and force them to surrender without 
a fight: see in general n. G. Chrissis, Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-
Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282 [Medieval Church Studies 2], Turnhout 2012, 
61-68.
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standards: that of the year 125527. After the death of Emperor John III Vatatzes 
(early November 1254), Tsar Michael Asen took advantage of the vacuum 
of power to reclaim a number of fortified towns along the border of the 
Thracian possessions of Nicaea with Bulgaria. John’s successor, Theodore II 
Laskaris, did not waste any time. It was still winter (probably early February 
1255) when he left Asia Minor with as many troops as he could raise in a 
hurry and crossed over to Thrace, picking up reinforcements along the way. 
He reached Adrianople (mod. Edirne), where he spent one day, and then 
moved on again, seeking a decisive confrontation with the main force of the 
Bulgarian army. His scouts managed to locate the Bulgarian advance guard, 
but the main force under Michael Asen declined to give battle and beat a 
hasty nocturnal retreat. Theodore II led his army in a raid all the way to 
Beroe (mod. Stara Zagora), 120 km. NW of Adrianople, where he captured 
booty, prisoners and flocks before the harsh winter conditions forced him 
to return to his base28. When he reached Adrianople, the Byzantine emperor 
split his forces: one part of the army was ordered to recapture the fortified 
towns of the region of Achridos29; Theodore II took personal command of 
the other part and led it against the fortified towns north of the Rhodope 
Mountains still held by Michael Asen. While the emperor laid siege to 
(and eventually captured) the Bulgarian strongholds of Stenimachos (mod. 
Asenovgrad, 20 km. SE of Plovdiv), Perist(r)itza (mod. Peruštica, 20 km. 
SW of Plovdiv) and neighboring krytzimos (mod. kričim, 26 km. SW of 
27. For the military events of 1255 and the political developments that led to Theodore 
II’s expedition, see in general n. s. kanellopoulos – J. k. lekea, The Struggle between the 
Nicaean Empire and the Bulgarian State (1254–1256): Towards a Revival of Byzantine 
Military Tactics under Theodore II Laskaris, Journal of Medieval Military History 7 
(2009), 56-69; a. MadGearu, The Asanids. The Political and Military History of the Second 
Bulgarian Empire (1185–1280), Leiden – Boston 2017, 240-242; d. anGelov, The Byzantine 
Hellene. The Life of Emperor Theodore Laskaris and Byzantium in the Thirteenth Century, 
Cambridge 2019, 151-159.
28. George Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, ed. Α. Ηeisenberg, Georgii Acropolitae 
Opera I, Leipzig 1903 (repr. p. wirth, Stuttgart 1978), 111-113; Theodore Skoutariotes, 
Σύνοψις Χρονική, ed. Κ. sathas, Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη Ζ΄, Paris – Venice 1894, 514-515.
29. On the location and historical geography of the region, see C. asdraCha, La 
région des Rhodopes aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: étude de géographie historique [Texte und 
Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie 49], Athens 1976, 10-11, 244-245.
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Plovdiv)30, his generals captured Ephraim (probably mod. Efrem, 53 km. 
NW of Adrianople), kryvous (exact location unknown, probably between 
Ephraim and Perperakion), Perperakion (eight km. NW of mod. Perperek), 
and Oustra (one km. NW of mod. Ustren)31.
After the capture of Stenimachos, Perist(r)itza and krytzimos, 
Theodore II Laskaris led his troops further west, planning to invest and 
reduce Tzepaina (mod. Čepina). By then it was probably early spring, but 
the weather was still inclement and the fort, situated high on a steep, thickly 
wooded mountain32, seemed impregnable; so the Byzantine emperor decided 
to abandon the siege and retire, possibly to Philippoupolis (mod. Plovdiv)33. 
When spring had finally set in, Theodore sent another expedition against 
the Bulgarian fort; however, his two generals, Constantine Tornikes and 
Alexios Strategopoulos, made a mess of the campaign and the Byzantine 
troops were forced to retreat to Serres, losing a great number of horses in 
the process34.
News of this failure of the Byzantine army before the walls of 
Tzepaina emboldened Dragotas, a Bulgarian soldier who had gone over to 
the Byzantines in 1246 and had been rewarded with the command of the 
Byzantine troops stationed around Melenikon (mod. Melnik). In the spring 
or early summer of 1255 Dragotas led a mutiny of his troops and besieged 
the Byzantine garrison in Melenikon; its commanders, however, managed 
to hold on to the fort. When Theodore II Laskaris, who had retired with the 
main part of his army after failing to capture Tzepaina, received word of the 
uprising (probably in early summer), he marched to Serres and from there 
headed towards Melenikon. Dragotas attempted to block the Byzantine 
army’s advance along the Strymon River valley by withdrawing his troops 
from around Melenikon and constructing field fortifications across the 
30. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 113; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 515.
31. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 108, 113, 119; Theodore II Laskaris, Ἐπιστολαί, 
ed. n. festa, Theodori Ducae Lascaris Epistulae CCXVII, Firenze 1898, 247-248; 
Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 514-515.
32. On the strong position of its fort, see D. Cončev, La forteresse ΤΖΕΠΑΙΝΑ–Čepina, 
BSl 20 (1959), 285-304.
33. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 113-114; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 515.
34. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 114; Theodore Laskaris, Ἐπιστολαί, 251-255; 
Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 515-516.
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Rupel Pass; Theodore II’s troops, however, put the enemy to flight (mortally 
wounding Dragotas in the process), then marched on to relieve Melenikon 
and its beleaguered garrison. From there the Byzantine army proceeded to 
Thessaloniki35.
In the autumn of 1255 Theodore II, once again at the head of his army, 
left Thessaloniki and camped near Vodena (mod. Edessa), waiting for a bout 
of dysentery that was ravaging both himself and his troops to subside. He 
then went to Prilapos (mod. Prilep) for supplies and siege engines, and from 
there marched against Velesos (mod. Veles, formerly Titov Veles), a fortified 
town that had passed from Epiros to the possession of Nicaea in 1252, only 
to be captured by Michael Asen two years later. The Bulgarian garrison 
did not even wait for the Byzantine siege engines to be unloaded from the 
wagons and assembled; the emperor accepted their capitulation and allowed 
them to leave with their weapons. The Byzantine army then marched through 
the region of Neustapolis (mod. Ovče Pole) and finally returned to Serres by 
way of Stroummitza (mod. Strumiča) and Melenikon36.
Although it was rather late in the campaigning season, Theodore II 
planned yet another attack on Tzepaina, since he was loathe to leave the place 
in Bulgarian hands. So, after he had moved most of his troops to the vicinity 
of Adrianople and Didymoteichon (he had received alarming news from his 
trusted official George Mouzalon regarding the situation in the East)37, he 
ordered the men to prepare for an advance on Tzepaina, even though winter 
had almost set in. The decision proved unwise and the expedition to besiege 
the Bulgarian stronghold quickly devolved into a chevauchée –if such a term 
can be used for an expedition that included so many foot-soldiers– before 
the emperor ordered the expeditionary force to return to Adrianople and 
thence to Didymoteichon. By then, 1255 was almost over, so Theodore II 
35. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 114-117; Theodore Laskaris, Ἐπιστολαί, 254-
255; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 516-517. See also th. n. vlaChos, Die Geschichte der 
byzantinischen Stadt Melenikon, Thessaloniki 1969, 46-47.
36. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 117-118; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 518.
37. Byzantinists tend to disregard the turmoil caused by the Mongol invasions and 
the ripple effect these had on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean: for a 
brief overview, see J. GieBfried, The Mongol invasions and the Aegean world (1241–61), 
Mediterranean Historical Review 28 (2013), 129-139.
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left behind a strong force under two of his generals and proceeded to cross 
over to Asia Minor, where he arrived in time to celebrate Christmas38.
It is clear that earlier historians who might have liked to view Late 
Byzantine military history through the prism of Niederwerfungsstrategie 
would have been disappointed. Although at the beginning of the campaign 
Theodore II was anxious to fight the Bulgarian army, Michael Asen avoided 
a pitched battle. There followed a series of no less than 13 sieges –though 
some of them abortive– and only one battle; even the latter was nothing 
more than an assault upon field fortifications. The Byzantines as well as 
the Bulgarians appear to have been ready to use attrition and manoeuvre 
as key elements in their respective strategies, and before the emperor of 
Nicaea returned to Asia Minor he instructed the commanders of the force 
he left behind not to engage in open battle against the Bulgarians’ Cuman 
auxiliaries; the fact that, when they disobeyed them, they lost their army 
and one of them was taken prisoner, explains why Theodore II wanted to 
avoid such unnecessary risks39.
Although counterfactual history –i.e. attempts by historians (usually 
in response to “what if” questions) to imagine how things might have 
gone differently– is not held in high esteem by academia, we actually have 
an historical example of what might have taken place had Michael Asen 
offered battle at the very beginning of Theodore II’s Bulgarian campaign. 
In 1230 the Nicaean emperor’s namesake, the ruler of Epiros, mounted an 
expedition into Bulgaria similar to that of Theodore II Lascaris. However, 
Theodore komnenos Doukas’ aim was not to annex lands – it was to seek 
out and destroy the Bulgarian army, in order to eliminate any threat to his 
rear before attacking Latin-held Constantinople40. Unlike what happened 25 
years later, the Bulgarian tsar was happy to oblige: Ivan Asen II led his 
troops and Cuman allies against the invading Byzantines and their Latin 
38. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 118-124; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 518-522.
39. On the military presence of steppe peoples in the Balkans during the period in 
question, see i. vásáry, Cumans and Tatars. Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 
1185–1365, Cambridge 2005.
40. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 41-43; Skoutariotes, Σύνοψις Χρονική, 474-
475; Nikephoros Gregoras, Ῥωμαϊκὴ Ἱστορία, ed. l. shopen, Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina 
Historia I [CSHB], Bonn 1829, 28.
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mercenary knights. In a pitched battle fought near the village of klokotnitsa, 
Theodore komnenos Doukas lost both the fight and his kingdom41.
The danger of staking everything on the uncertain outcome of a 
“decisive battle” was not lost on contemporary Byzantines. In June 1211 
Theodore I Lascaris decided to face the invading forces of the Seljuk sultan 
Ghiyāth ad-Dīn kaykhusraw I in battle. Fifty years later, the historian George 
Akropolites called the emperor’s decision “a roll of the dice”42. However, it 
was the strategic importance of the Maeander valley in general –and of the 
fortified town of Antioch (possibly near mod. Aliağaçiftliği) in particular– 
that forced the Byzantine ruler’s hand; in fact, it was kaykhusraw who rolled 
the dice, and his arrogant decision to accept battle ultimately cost him his 
life43.
The case of Antioch was hardly an isolated one. The “Gazetteer of 
Late Byzantine Military Conflicts” contains a number of battles that were 
connected to a siege. As early as 1205, the encounter outside the walls of 
Arkadiopolis (mod. Lüleburgaz) –classified as a battle in the “Gazetteer”– 
was actually a sortie by the town’s Latin garrison against the Byzantine 
rebels besieging it. A few weeks later, the battle of Adrianople (which, 
it should be noted, did not meet the criteria that would allow it to be 
included in the “Gazetteer”44) was brought about by the intervention of 
Tsar kaloyan, whose troops and Cuman auxiliaries marched to relieve 
the Byzantine defenders of the Thracian city when it was besieged by an 
army of Franks and Venetians45. The battle near Pharsala (c. 1277) was a 
41. Brief accounts of the klokotnitsa campaign may be found in J. v. a. fine, The 
Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman 
Conquest, Ann Arbor 1987, 124-126; f. BredenkaMp, The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki 
(1224–1242), Thessaloniki 1996, 150-153; MadGearu, Asanids, 201-204.
42. Akropolites, Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή, 15-16: καὶ οἷον ἐπὶ κύβου τὸν πόλεμον θείς.
43. For a general overview of the military and diplomatic maneuvers of 1211, see 
Giarenis, Συγκρότηση, 70-82.
44. It was not eligible since neither of the opponents were Byzantines. This criterion has 
also precluded the inclusion of such large-scale decisive battles as köse Dağ (1243), Halmyros 
(1311), kossovo (1389), Nicopolis (1396), Ankara (1402), and Varna (1444).
45. Geoffrey Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, ch. 347-366; Choniates, 
Χρονικὴ Διήγησις, 615-617. See also Α. Krantonelli, Ἡ κατὰ τῶν Λατίνων Ἑλληνο-
Βουλγαρικὴ σύμπραξις ἐν Θρᾴκῃ 1204–1206, Athens 1964, 72-73; MadGearu, Asanids, 
144-150.
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meeting engagement between a force led by John I Doukas of Thessaly and 
an army sent by Michael VIII Palaiologos to supply the local garrison46, 
while that of Bellegrada (outside mod. Berat) in 1281 was fought by 
Byzantine reinforcements skirmishing with an Angevin army that was 
besieging the city47. Another engagement that has been classified as a battle 
in the “Gazetteer” is Bizye (1307), an example of overconfidence on the 
part of Byzantine civilians, who managed to convince the city’s garrison 
commander, the megas tzaousios Oumbertopoulos, to lead them in a sortie 
against the besieging Catalans48.
The aforementioned armed conflict forms part of a larger war between 
the Byzantine Empire and the Grand Catalan Company which, despite the 
notions of earlier patriotic Spanish historians, who wished to view it as a 
glorious expedition similar to that of the later Conquistadors, was nothing 
more than a short interlude in the military history of the Byzantine Empire49. 
Consisting of a single pitched battle, that of Apros (1305), and a large 
number of raids and sieges of Byzantine cities in Thrace and Macedonia, 
many of them unsuccessful, the conflict between the Catalan mercenaries 
and their former employers clearly showed that, even after the Byzantine 
defeat at Apros, it was their ability to defend their cities –especially major 
urban centers, like Adrianople in 1306 and Thessaloniki in 1308– that 
46. George Pachymeres, Συγγραφικαὶ ἱστορίαι, ed. a. failler, Georges Pachymérès, 
Relations historiques II [CFHB 24/2], Paris 1984, 527. See also kanellopoulos, Οργάνωση, 
109, and d. J. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258–1282. A 
Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations, Cambridge, Mass. 1959, 297.
47. kanellopoulos, Οργάνωση, 112-118.
48. Pachymeres, Συγγραφικαὶ ἱστορίαι, ed. failler, Georges Pachymérès, Relations 
historiques IV [CFHB 24/4], Paris 1999, 693. See also a. laiou, Constantinople and the 
Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II 1282–1328, Cambridge, Mass. 1972, 169-170; 
Bartusis, Late Byzantine Army, 293; kyriakidis, Warfare, 168-170.
49. A brief account of the Catalan episode may be found in laiou, Constantinople, 158-
226; for more recent treatments of the subject, see d. JaCoBy, The Catalan Company in the 
East: The Evolution of an Itinerant Army (1303–1311), in: The Medieval Way of War: Studies 
in Medieval Military History in Honor of Bernard S. Bachrach, ed. G. i. halfond, Farnham - 
Burlington 2015, 153-182; v. pueCh, Quelques aspects des relations des mercenaires catalans 
avec le pouvoir impérial byzantin au début du XIVe siècle, in: Figures de l’autorité médiévale. 
Mélanges offerts à Michel Zimmermann, ed. p. ChastanG – p. henriet – C. soussen, Paris 
2016, 221-233.
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ultimately proved decisive. One may juxtapose this with the outcome of 
the war against the Duchy of Athens in 1311. When the Catalans turned 
against their Frankish masters for non-payment of the salaries they were 
owed, Gautier V de Brienne believed that he could easily defeat them in a 
pitched battle. The result was a resounding victory for the Catalans: they 
killed the Frankish duke and most of his lords, and ruled over Boeotia and 
Attica until 138850.
Let us conclude by reiterating the axiom that battle avoidance was 
neither new nor uncommon in the lands around the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Despite what some proponents of the notion of a “Western way of war” 
would have us believe, both the Byzantines and their opponents would 
frequently apply Ermattungsstrategie and Manöverstrategie if it suited their 
purposes (and for much of the Late Byzantine period their purpose was 
simply to survive)51. It would take the creation of powerful polities like the 
Ottoman Empire and the kingdom of Hungary for the Balkans and the 
lands north of the Danube to once again become a field upon which large-
scale decisive battles would be fought52. Indeed, some might say that the 
rule of the Ottomans over Southeastern Europe was consolidated only when 
they crushed the Hungarian army at Mohács (1526). But it was the war of 
attrition against the Greeks of Asia Minor, the sack of Thessaloniki in 1430, 
Constantinople in 1453 and Trebizond in 1461, along with the destructive 
raids against the Despotate of the Morea, that had created the Ottoman 
Empire in the first place.
50. On the battle, see G. t. kolias, Ἡ μεταξὺ Καταλανῶν καὶ μεγάλου δουκὸς τῶν 
Ἀθηνῶν μάχη (1311), ΕΕΒΣ 26 (1956), 358-379; k. devries, Infantry Warfare in the Early 
Fourteenth Century, Woodbridge – Rochester 1996, 58-65.
51. For an interesting study of sieges in fifteenth-century Western Greece and the use 
of “indirect approach” tactics (often by those same Franks who attributed such “dishonest” 
practices to the Byzantines) in siege warfare, see e. synkellou, Εναλλακτικές μορφές 
πολέμου κατά τον όψιμο Μεσαίωνα: η «κλεψία», Βυζαντιακά 30 (2012–2013), 345-363.
52. See t. pálosfalvi, From Nicopolis to Mohács. A History of Ottoman-Hungarian 
Warfare, 1389–1526 [The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 63], Leiden – Boston 2018. 
Manpower and finances played a cardinal role in a state’s ability to field large armies. This 
explains why the opponents in one of the largest battles of the Byzantine civil wars, that 
of Didymoteichon (also known as the battle of Demotika), were Byzantine in name only: 
the army of John V Palaiologos consisted of Serbs and Bulgarians, while that of John VI 
kantakouzenos was fully Ottoman; see fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, 325-326.
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ΜιΑ eπισΚοπΗσΗ των πολεΜιΚων συγΚρουσεων στο υστερο ΒυζΑντιο: 
ΘεωρΗτιΚο πλΑισιο ΚΑι συγχρονΗ ερευνΑ
Η μελέτη αποτελεί μία πρώιμη σύνοψη των συμπερασμάτων 
που προκύπτουν από το υλικό που συγκεντρώθηκε στο πλαίσιο του 
ερευνητικού προγράμματος «Ευρετήριο Πολεμικών Συγκρούσεων 
της Ύστερης Βυζαντινής Περιόδου». Οι παλαιότεροι μελετητές της 
στρατιωτικής ιστορίας είχαν υιοθετήσει ένα θεωρητικό υπόβαθρο το 
οποίο βασιζόταν στην έννοια της «αποφασιστικής μάχης», όπως την είχαν 
διατυπώσει οι θεωρητικοί του πολέμου τον 19ο αι. Μετά από μία σύντομη 
αναδρομή στην ιστορία της έρευνας, ιδίως των τελευταίων δεκαετιών, 
αναλύονται ορισμένα χαρακτηριστικά παραδείγματα εκστρατειών που 
χρονολογούνται στην υστεροβυζαντινή περίοδο. Το συμπέρασμα το οποίο 
συνάγεται από την ανάλυση αυτή είναι ότι οι εκ παρατάξεως μάχες ήταν 
κατά πολύ σπανιότερες σε σχέση με άλλου τύπου συγκρούσεις (κυρίως 
πολιορκίες και επιδρομές) που στόχο είχαν να φθείρουν τον αντίπαλο 
και όχι να καταστρέψουν τον στρατό του. 
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